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We consider a situation where one has to choose an option with multiplier m. The multiplier
is inversely proportional to the number of people who have chosen the option and is propor-
tional to the return if it is correct. If one does not know the correct option, we call him a
herder, and then there is a zero-sum game between the herder and other people who have set
the multiplier. The max-min strategy where one divides one’s choice inversely proportional to
m is optimal from the viewpoint of the maximization of expected return. We call the optimal
herder an analog herder. The system of analog herders takes the probability of correct choice
to one for any value of the ratio of herders, p < 1, in the thermodynamic limit if the accuracy
of the choice of informed person q is one. We study how herders choose by a voting exper-
iment in which 50 to 60 subjects sequentially answer a two-choice quiz. We show that the
probability of selecting a choice by the herders is inversely proportional to m for 4/3 ≤ m ≤ 4
and they collectively adopt the max-min strategy in that range.
KEYWORDS: herd, information cascade, zero-sum game, experiment, max-min strategy, econophysics,
socio-physics
1. Introduction
Even if each person has limited information, aggregated information becomes very accu-
rate.1 This is the wisdom of crowd effect, and is supported by many examples from political
elections, sports predictions, quiz shows, and prediction markets.2–4 In contrast, in order to
∗E-mail: mori@sci.kitasato-u.ac.jp
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give accurate results, three conditions need to be satisfied: diversity, independence, and decen-
tralization. If these conditions are not satisfied, aggregated information becomes unreliable
or worse.2, 5 However, in an ever-more connected world, it becomes more and more difficult
to retain independence. Furthermore, if the actions or choices of others are visible, neglecting
them is not realistic in light of the merit of social learning.6, 7 In this case, information cascade
may emerge and information aggregation ceases.8–14
More concretely, we consider a situation where people sequentially answer a two-choice
question with choices A and B. The payoff for the correct choice is constant . Before this ques-
tion is asked, many other people have already answered and their choices are made known as
CA people choosing A and CB people choosing B, which is called social information. If the
person answering knows the correct choice, he should choose it. His choice is not affected by
social information. We then call him an independent voter. However, if he does not know the
correct choice, he will be affected by social information.15 He tends to go with the majority
and we then call him a herder. By herding, the wisdom of crowds is on the edge. If a herder
is isolated from others, his choice becomes A and B, and should be canceled. As a result, the
choice by an independent voter remains. The majority choice always converges to the correct
one in the limit of a large number of people. This is known as Condorcet’s jury theorem.1
However, if others’ choices are given as social information, the cancellation mechanism does
not work. The herder copies the majority and ignores the correct information given by the
independent voter. If the proportion of herders p exceeds some threshold value pc, there oc-
curs a phase transition from the one-peak phase where the majority choice always converges
to the correct one to the two-peak phase where the majority choice converges to the wrong
one with a finite and positive probability.16 We call this phase transition the information cas-
cade transition.16–18 This is the risk of imitation in the wisdom of crowd. How can we avoid
this risk? There exists a hint in race-track betting markets19, 20 and prediction markets.21, 22 In
order to aggregate information scattered among people, the market mechanism can be very
effective.2–4
We consider a situation in which each choice α ∈ {A, B} has a multiplier Mα that is
inversely proportional to the number of subjects Cα who chose it. The payoff for the correct
choice is proportional to the multiplier. If the multiplier of a choice is large, the number
of people who chose it is small. If the return is constant, herder usually avoid the choice.
However, now, the return on the correct choice is proportional to the multiplier, and hence we
cannot say that herder does not choose it. Copying the majority gives him a small return, even
if it is a correct choice. The multiplier plays the role of a “tax” on herding (free riding) and
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copying the minority can be an attractive choice. The situation is a zero-sum game between
the herder answering and all the previous subjects who have set the multipliers. In zero-sum
games, the max-min strategy maximizes the expected return and is optimal.23 In the above
two-choice quiz, the max-min strategy is the one where a herder chooses α with a probability
proportional to Cα and cancels the risk in expected return by the multipliers. We call the
herder who adopts the optimal max-min strategy an analog herder.24, 25 If a herder behaves
as an analog herder, the convergence to equilibrium state becomes slow as p increases and
there occurs a phase transition in the convergence speed as p exceeds half.25 However, the
information cascade phase transition does not occur for p < 1. A majority of people always
choose the correct choice in the limit of a large number of people (thermodynamic limit) and
the system is in the one-peak phase for any value of p if the accuracy of the information of the
independent voter q is q > 1/2.25 Furthermore, the analog herder’s choice does not affect the
limit value of the percentage of correct answer and it converges to q. As for the two-choice
quiz, the independent voter knows the correct choice and q = 1 holds. In this case, the system
of analog herders maximizes the probability of correct choice for p < 1 in the thermodynamic
limit. Even in limit p → 1, the system can take the probability to one.
In this paper, we have adopted an experimental approach to study whether herders adopt
the max-min strategy and behave as analog herders if the choices have multipliers. We have
also studied a herder’s probability of correct choice. The organization of the paper is as fol-
lows. We explain the experiment and derive the optimal max-min strategy in section 2. The
subjects answer a two-choice quiz in three cases r ∈ {O,C, M}. In case O, the subjects an-
swer without social information. In cases C and M, they receive social information based
on previous subjects’ choices. Social information is given as summary statistics {CA,CB} in
case C and as multipliers {MA, MB} in case M. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the analysis
of the experimental data. In section 3, we summarize data about the macroscopic aspects of
the system. In section 4, we derive a microscopic rule regarding how herders copy others in
each case r ∈ {C, M}. In section 5, we introduce a stochastic model that simulates the system.
We study the transition ratio pc(r) for cases r ∈ {C, M}. We estimate the probability of correct
choice by the herders in the experiment and compare it with that of the optimal analog herders
system. Section 6 is devoted to the summary and discussions. In the appendices, we give some
supplementary information about the experiment and a simulation study of the convergence
exponent. We also prove that only the system of analog herders can take the probability of
correct choice to one in limit p → 1.
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2. Experimental setup and optimal strategy in case M
2.1 Experimental setup
The experiment reported here was conducted at the Group Experiment Laboratory of
the Center for Experimental Research in Social Sciences at Hokkaido University. We have
conducted two experiments. We call them EXP-I and EXP-II. In EXP-I (II), we recruited 120
(104) students from the university. We divided them into two groups, Group A and Group B,
and prepared two sequences of subjects of average length 60 (52). The main motive to divide
the subjects into two groups is to ensure many choice sequences in order to estimate the
average value of macroscopic quantities. In addition, we can check the estimation of herders’
ratio p by comparing the values from the two groups for the same question.16
The subjects sequentially answered a two-choice quiz of 120 questions. Some subjects
could not answer all the questions within the alloted time, and so the number T of subjects
who answered a particular question varied. We label the questions by i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 120} and
denote the length of the sequence of the subjects for question i by Ti. In EXP-I, the subject
answers in three cases r ∈ {O,C, M} in this order. We denote the answer to question i in
case r after t − 1 subjects’ answers by X(i, t|r), which takes the value 1 (0) if the choice is
true (false). The order t of the subject in the choice sequence {X(i, t|r)} plays the role of time.
{C0(i, t|r),C1(i, t|r)} are the number of subjects who choose true and false for question i among
the prior t subjects and are given as
C1(i, t|r) =
t∑
t′=1
X(i, t′|r),
C0(i, t|r) = t − C1(i, t|r).
In case O, the subject answered without any social information. Then, he answered in case
C. When t− 1 subjects have already answered question i before him in his group, he received
summary statistics {C0(i, t − 1|C),C1(i, t − 1|C)} from all of them. For the correct choice
in cases O and C, the subject gets two points. Finally, in case M, when t − 1 subjects have
already answered question i before him in his group, the subject receives multipliers {M0(i, t−
1), M1(i, t − 1)} from all previous t − 1 subjects. For the correct choice, the subject gets the
points which is given by the multiplier. The multiplier Mα for α ∈ {0, 1} was calculated based
on the summary statistics in case M as
Mα(i, t − 1) = C0(i, t − 1|M) +C1(i, t − 1|M) + 1Cα(i, t − 1|M) + 1
=
t
Cα(i, t − 1|M) + 1 .
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The multiplier is given by dividing total points C0 + C1 + 1 = t for all subjects with choice
value among Cα + 1 subjects who have chosen α. This is similar to the payoff odds of the
parimutuel system in gambling.
In EXP-II, in addition to the three cases r ∈ {O,C, M}, the subjects answered in at most
four cases r ∈ {1, 5, 11, 21} between cases O and C. In cases r ∈ {1, 5, 11, 21}, the subject
received summary statistics {C0(i, t − 1|r),C1(i, t − 1|r)} from previous r subjects. C0(i, t −
1|r)+C1(i, t−1|r) = r holds and as r increases, the amount of social information increases. In
EXP-I, the amount of social information increases rapidly from r = 0 in case O to r = t − 1
in case C. In EXP-II, r gradually increases. The payoff for the correct choice is 1 in cases
r ∈ {O, 1, 5, 11, 21,C} and the multiplier in case M. Detailed information about EXP-II has
been presented in our previous work,16 where we have studied the experimental data for cases
r ∈ {O, 1, 5, 11, 21,C}. In this paper, we concentrate on case M and take case C as the control
case.
We repeated the same experiment for both Groups A and B. We obtained 120 × 2 se-
quences {X(i, t|r)} for each r ∈ {O,C, M}. We label the sequence in Group B by i + 120, so
that i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 240}. The experimental design is summarized in Table I.
Table I. Experimental design. T means the number of subjects and {r} means the cases where the subjects
answered the quiz. I means the number of questions. The length Ti of sequence {X(i, t|r)} for question i is almost
the same as T in EXP-I. In EXP-II, it depends on i and the average value is 50.8.
Experiment Group T Cases {r} I
EXP-I A 57 {O,C, M} 120
EXP-I B 63 {O,C, M} 120
EXP-II A 52 {O, 1, 5, 11, 21,C, M} 120
EXP-II B 52 {O, 1, 5, 11, 21,C, M} 120
2.2 Max-Min Strategy in case M
We derive the optimal strategy for herders in case M. A subject can choose α ∈ {A, B}.
We suppose that he votes one unit for a choice and call him a voter. Here, we consider the
case where one vote can be divided by the voter. If a voter believes A is correct, he votes one
unit for A. If the voter does not know the answer at all, he votes 0.5 unit for A and 0.5 unit
for B. We assume that a voter thinks the probability that A is correct is β, and the probability
that B is correct is 1 − β. The voter divides one unit vote into x for A and 1 − x for B by his
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decision making. Expected return R is
R = β · MA · x + (1 − β) · MB · (1 − x)
= β(MAx − MB(1 − x)) + MB(1 − x). (1)
We assume that herders do not have information about the correct answers without multi-
pliers {MA, MB}. Hence, we assume that a herder cannot estimate the probabilities of correct
answer β as Knightian uncertainty, because he has no knowledge to answer the question.26
The situation is a zero-sum game between the herder and other previous voters as the multi-
pliers are set such that all votes are divided by the voters who have chosen the correct option.
The max-min strategy has been proved to be optimal in game theory.23 The voter minimizes
the expected loss due to the uncertainty in the choice. In order to minimize the expected loss
from the uncertainty, it should be chosen such that MA · x = MB · (1− x) holds, from (1). This
position has no sensibility for β.
We can calculate x from (1),
x =
MB
MB + MA
. (2)
As multiplier Mα is calculated as
Mα =
t + 1
Cα + 1
,
ratio x for A is then
x =
CA + 1
t + 2
∼
CA
t
for t >> 1. (3)
x becomes proportional to CA and it is the voting strategy of analog herders.25
The discussion shows that the strategy of analog herders is optimal for a herder as it
maximizes his expected return. In our experiment, the voter cannot divide one’s vote (choice).
Hence, the averaged behavior of herders becomes akin to that of the analog herders, when
herders adopt the optimal strategy.
We make one comment about the optimal strategy for the independent voter. When β = 1,
the voter believes his information and chooses what he believes to be true. When β < 1, it is
not optimal to do so in general. The expected return R in (1) is
R = (β · MA − (1 − β) · MB)x + MB(1 − β). (4)
By maximizing R, we obtain x as
x = θ(β · MA − (1 − β) · MB).
Here, θ is a Heaviside (step) function. If β · MA > (1 − β) · MB, he chooses A and vice versa.
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He behaves as an “arbitrager” for β < 1. It is the risk-neutral strategy that has been discussed
in the context of racetrack betting markets and prediction markets.20, 22
3. Data analysis : Macroscopic Aspects
We obtained 240 sequences {X(i, t|r)}, t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Ti} for question i ∈ {1, · · · , 240} and
cases r ∈ {O,C, M} in each experiment. Data {X(i, t|r)} for both experiments is downloadable
at http://arxiv.org/abs/1211.3193. The percentage of correct answers of sequence {X(i, t|r)}
for question i in case r is defined as Z(i|r) = ∑Ti
s=1 X(i, s|r)/Ti. In the analysis, the subjects are
classified into two categories–independent voters and herders–for each question. We assume
that the probability q of a correct choice for independent voters and herders is 100% and 50%,
respectively.16 For a group with p(i) herders and 1 − p(i) independent voters, the expectation
value of Z(i|O) is 1 − p(i)/2. The maximal likelihood estimate of p(i) is given as p(i) =
2(1 − Z(i|O)).
3.1 Distribution of Z(i|r)
There are 240 samples of sequences of choices for each r. We divide these samples into
11 bins according to the size of Z(i|r), as shown in Table II. The number of data samples in
each bin for cases r ∈ {O,C, M} are given in the second, third and fourth column as N(No.|r).
Social information causes remarkable changes in subjects’ choices. For case O, there is one
peak at No. 7, and for case C(M), there are peaks at No. 2 (4) and No. 11 (10) in EXP-I.
The samples in each bin of case O share almost the same value of p. For example, in the
samples of No. 6 bin (0.45 < Z(i|O) ≤ 0.55), there are almost only herders in the subjects’
sequence and p(i) ≃ 100%. In contrast, in the samples of No. 11 bin (Z(i|O) > 0.95), almost
all subjects know the answer to the questions and are independent (p(i) ≃ 0%). An extremely
small value of Z(i|O) indicates some bias in the question and we omit the samples that satisfy
Z(i|O) < 0.45. In addition, the minimum value of Z(i|r) should be 1−p(i). If Z(i|r) < 1−p(i), it
means that the estimation of p(i) for the sequence {X(i, t|r)} fails. The true value of p(i) should
be larger than the estimated value. We cannot give the appropriate estimation of p(i) for the
choice sequence and we omit the samples that satisfy Z(i|C) < 1 − p(i) or Z(i|M) < 1 − p(i).
From these procedures, we are left with 167 (177) samples in EXP-I (II) and we denote the
set by I′. I(No.) denotes the set of samples in each bin in case O among I′.
We comment about the above data elimination procedure. The main purpose of the ex-
periment is to clarify how herders copy others’ choices. For the purpose, it is necessary to
assure that herders choose each option with equal probability in case O and the herder’s q is
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Table II. Effect of social information on subjects’ decisions. The upper (lower) table summarizes the data
for EXP-I (II). We divide the samples according to the size of Z(i|r). N(No.|r) denotes the number of samples
for case r in each bin. I(No.) is the set of sample i in each bin of case O after removing the samples that satisfy
Z(i|O) < 45% or Z(i|C) < (1− p(i)) or Z(i|M) < (1− p(i)). |I(No.)| means the number of samples in the set. pavg
is estimated as the average value of p(i) = 2(1− Z(i|O)) over the samples in I(No.). In the last two columns, the
ratio of the case with {Z(i|r) < 1/2} for r ∈ {C, M} among the samples in I(No.) is shown.
No. Z(i|r)[%] N(No.|O) N(No.|C) N(No.|M) |I(No.)| pavg(No.)[%] Z(i|C) < 1/2 Z(i|M) < 1/2
1 < 5 0 5 0 NA NA NA NA
2 5 ∼ 15 3 33 7 NA NA NA NA
3 15 ∼ 25 5 28 25 NA NA NA NA
4 25 ∼ 35 18 9 30 NA NA NA NA
5 35 ∼ 45 35 5 13 NA NA NA NA
6 45 ∼ 55 38 5 13 38 97.5 18/38 17/38
7 55 ∼ 65 57 5 14 52 78.3 7/52 5/52
8 65 ∼ 75 29 7 19 26 60.3 0/26 0/26
9 75 ∼ 85 41 17 44 38 40.6 0/38 0/38
10 85 ∼ 95 11 57 62 11 21.3 0/11 0/11
11 ≥ 95 3 69 13 2 5.1 0/2 0/2
Total 240 240 240 167 66.8% 25/167 22/167
No. Z(i|r)[%] N(No.|O) N(No.|C) N(No.|M) |I(No.)| pavg(No.)[%] Z(i|C) < 1/2 Z(i|M) < 1/2
1 < 5 0 2 0 NA NA NA NA
2 5 ∼ 15 0 18 6 NA NA NA NA
3 15 ∼ 25 8 22 18 NA NA NA NA
4 25 ∼ 35 16 20 23 NA NA NA NA
5 35 ∼ 45 36 8 16 NA NA NA NA
6 45 ∼ 55 43 9 19 43 96.7 16/43 15/43
7 55 ∼ 65 46 10 16 45 79.3 8/45 3/45
8 65 ∼ 75 45 14 26 45 62.7 2/45 0/45
9 75 ∼ 85 33 33 56 33 41.9 0/33 0/33
10 85 ∼ 95 11 67 54 11 21.3 0/11 0/11
11 ≥ 95 2 37 6 0 NA NA NA
Total 240 240 240 177 68.7% 26/177 18/177
50%. This is the precondition of the experiment. We assume q = 0.5 and derive the above
three conditions that Z(i|r) should satisfy. If Z(i|r) contradicts with at least one of the condi-
tions, there is some bias in the options. The data for question i does not meet the precondition
and we discard it in the analysis of the experimental data. The elimination procedure cannot
8/25
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assure the precondition with absolute certainty, it is indispensable.
We calculate the average value of p(i) for the samples in I(No.). We denote it as pavg(No.)
and estimate it as
pavg(No.) = 1
|I(No.)|
∑
i∈I(No.)
p(i).
Here, |I(No.)| in the denominator means the number of samples in I(No.), which is given in
the sixth column of the table. In the last two columns, we show the ratio of the case with
{Z(i|r) < 1/2} for r ∈ {C, M} among the samples in I(No.|O). In both cases, as pavg increases,
the ratio increases rapidly to about half.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Z(
i|C
)
Z(i|O)
A
EXP-I
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Z(
i|M
)
Z(i|O)
B
EXP-I
Fig. 1. Scatter plots of Z(i|O) vs. Z(i|r) for (A) Case C and (B) Case M. The vertical lines show the border of
the bins in Table II. The rising diagonal line from (0.5, 0) to top right shows the boundary condition Z(i|r) = 1−p.
In order to see the social influence more pictorially, we show the scatter plots of Z(i|O)
vs. Z(i|r), r ∈ {C, M} of EXP-I in Fig. 1. The x-axis shows Z(i|O) and the y-axis shows
Z(i|r). The vertical lines show the boundary between the bins (from No. 1 to No. 11) for
case O in Table II. The rising diagonal line from (0.5, 0) to top right shows the boundary
condition Z(i|r) = 1 − p. If subjects’ answers are not affected by social information, data
would distribute on the diagonal line from (0, 0) to top right. As the plots clearly indicate, the
samples scatter more widely in the plane in case C than in case M, which means that social
influence is bigger in case C. For the samples with Z(i|O) ≥ 0.65 in case O (Nos. 8, 9, 10,
and 11 bins in Table II), the changes, Z(i|C) − Z(i|O), are almost positive and Z(i|C) takes a
value of about 1 in case C. In case M, the changes, Z(i|M) − Z(i|O), are also almost positive
and Z(i|M) takes a value of about 0.9. The average probability of choosing the correct option
improves with social information for the samples in both cases. In contrast, for the samples
with 0.45 ≤ Z(i|O) < 0.65 (Nos. 6 and 7 bins in Table II), social information does not
9/25
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necessarily improve average performance. There are many samples with Z(i|r) − Z(i|O) < 0
in both cases. These samples constitute the lower peak in Table II.
3.2 Asymptotic behavior of the convergence
We have seen drastic changes in the distribution of Z(i|r) from the distribution of Z(i|O).
Table II and Figure 1 show the two-peak structure in the distribution of Z(i|r). In our previous
work on the information cascade phase transition,16 we have studied the time dependence of
the convergence behavior of the sequences {X(i, t|r)}.
We denote the ratio of correct answers, C1(i,t|r)t , as
Z(i, t|r) ≡ C1(i, t|r)
t
=
1
t
t∑
s=1
X(i, s|r).
Z(i, Ti|r) = Z(i|r) holds by definition. By studying the asymptotic behavior of the conver-
gence of sequence {Z(i, t|r)} for the samples in I(No.), one can clarify the possibility of the
information cascade transition by varying p. The variance of Z(i, t|r) for the samples in I(No.)
is defined as
Var(Z(i, t|r))No.
=
1
|I(No.)|
∑
i∈I(No.)
(Z(i, t|r)− < Z(i, t|r) >No.)2
< Z(i, t|r) >No.=
1
|I(No.)|
∑
i∈I(No.)
Z(i, t|r).
Here, we denote the average value of Z(i, t|r) over the samples in I(No.) by < Z(i, t|r) >No..
In the one-peak phase, the variance of Z(i, t|r) for the samples with the same p converges to
zero in thermodynamic limit t → ∞. In the analysis of experimental data, the values of p
have some variance among the samples in each bin, and Var(Z(i, t|r))No. takes small values
in the limit. Depending on the convergence behavior, the one-peak phase is classified into
two phases.18 If Var(Z(i, t|r))No. shows normal diffusive behavior as Var((Z(i, t|r))No. ∝ t−1,
it is called the normal diffusion phase. We note that the variance is estimated for the ratio,
C1(i, t|r)/t, and the usual behavior t1 for the sum of t random variables is replaced by ∝ t/t2 =
t−1. If convergence is slow and Var(Z(i, t|r))No. ∝ t−γ with 0 < γ < 1, it is called the super
diffusion phase.27 In the two-peak phase, Var(Z(i, t|r))No. converges to some finite value in
limit t → ∞.17
Figure 2 shows the double logarithmic plots of Var(Z(i, t|r))No. as a function of t. We
see that convergence becomes very slow as pavg(No.) increases in general. The convergence
exponent γ is estimated by fitting with ∝ t−γ for t ≥ 10 in EXP-I. It decreases almost mono-
10/25
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Fig. 2. Convergent behavior. Convergence is given by the double logarithmic plot of Var(Z(i, t|r))No. vs. t
using the samples in four bins (Nos. 6 (◦), 7 (△), 8 (⋄), and 9 (×) in Table II) for (A) Case C in EXP-I, (B) Case
M in EXP-I, (C) Case C in EXP-II, and (D) Case M in EXP-II. The dotted lines are fitted results with ∝ t−γ for
t ≥ 10(20) in EXP-I (II).
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tonically from about 1 to −0.02 (0.14) with an increase in pavg in case C (M). Taking into
account the estimate error of the exponent given in Appendix E,
γs are almost 1 for the samples in I(9) and I(8), and the system is in the normal diffu-
sion (one-peak) phase in both cases r ∈ {C, M}. For the samples in I(7), γs are apparently
smaller than 1 and the system might be in the super diffusion phase. For the samples in I(6),
γ becomes negative (γ = −0.02) in case C. This suggests that the system is in the two-peak
phase for the samples in I(6).16 In case M, γ is positive even for the samples in I(6) and the
system might be in the super diffusion phase. However, the result does not necessarily deny
the existence of the two-peak phase, taking into account the variance of p(i) and the estimate
error of γ from the limited sample size. We can only say that if the two-peak phase exists, the
threshold value pc in case M is considerably larger than that in case C.
4. Data analysis: Microscopic Aspects
In this section, we study the microscopic aspects of the herders. We clarify how they copy
others’ choices and derive a microscopic rule in each case r ∈ {C, M}. In particular, we study
whether they behave as analog herders in case M.
4.1 How do herders copy others?
We determine how a herder’s decision depends on social information. For this purpose,
we need to subtract independent subjects’ contribution from X(i, t + 1|r). The probability of
being independent is 1− p(i), and such a subject always chooses 1. A herder’s contribution is
estimated as
(X(i, t + 1|r) − (1 − p(i)))/p(i).
How the herder’s decision depends on C1(i, t|r) = n1 is estimated by the expectation value of
(X(i, t+1|r)−(1− p(i))/p(i) under this condition. The expectation value means the probability
that a herder chooses an option under the influence of prior n1 subjects among t who choose
the same option. We denote it by qh(t, n1|r), and estimate it as
qh(t, n1|r) =
∑
i∈I′
[
X(i,t+1|r)−(1−p(i))
p(i)
]
δC1(i,t|r),n1∑
i∈I′ δC1(i,t|r),n1
. (5)
Here, δi, j is 1 (0) if i = j (i , j) and the denominator is the number of sequences where
C1(i, t|r) = n1. From the symmetry between 1 ↔ 0, we assume that qh(t, n1|r) = 1 − qh(t, t −
n1|r). We study the dependence of qh(t, n1|r) on n1/t and round n1/t to the nearest values in
{k/13(12)|k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 13(12)}} in EXP-I (II).
Figure 3 shows the plot of qh(t, n1|r) for (A) case C and (B) case M. We can clearly see
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Fig. 3. Microscopic rule of herder’s decision for (A) Case C and (B) Case M. It shows the probability
qh(t, n1|r) that a herder chooses an option under the influence of prior n1 subjects among t choosing that option
in case r. The thin dashed line in (A) shows 2(n1/t−1/2)+1/2. The dotted diagonal line in (B) shows the analog
herder model qh(t, n1) = n1/t.
the strong tendency to copy others in case C. As n1/t increases from 1/2, qh(t, n1|C) rapidly
increases and the slope at n1/t = 1/2 is about 2.0 in EXP-I. Such nonlinear behavior is known
as a quorum response in social science and ethology.28 The magnitude of the slope measures
the strength of the herders’ response. Comparing EXP-I and EXP-II, the response of herders
is more sharp in EXP-I than in EXP-II. In EXP-II, where the amount of social information
increases gradually, the subjects tend to copy others’ choices more prudently than in EXP-I.
If the slope exceeds 1, the system shows the information cascade transition. The transition
ratio pc depends on the slope. In the digital herders case, where qh(t, n1) = θ(n1 − t/2) and
the slope is infinite, pc takes 0.5.17 As the slope reduces to 1, pc increases to 1 and the phase
transition disappears in the limit.25
Contrary to case C, the dependence of qh(t, n1|M) on n1/t is weak and the slope at n1/t =
1/2 is almost 1 in case M. In range 1/4 ≤ n1/t ≤ 3/4, qh(t, n1|M) lies on the diagonal
dotted line and the herders almost behave as analog herders. As the multiplier m is the inverse
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of n1/t for a large t, the average herder adopts the optimal max-min strategy in the range
4/3 ≤ m ≤ 4. As the slope at n1/t = 1/2 is small, if the information cascade phase transition
occurs, the transition ratio pc should become large as compared to in case C. One can also see
an interesting behavior of herders. If the minority choice ratio n1/t is smaller than 1/4 and
multiplier m exceeds 4, some herders make the choice. As a result, if n1/t > 3/4, qh(t, n1|M)
becomes almost constant, about 3/4. We can interpret this as some of the herders preferring
a big multiplier (long-shot) and qh(t, n1) saturating at 3/4.
5. Analysis with stochastic model
In this section, we simulate the system by a stochastic model, which we call a voting
model. We consider a system with p herders and 1 − p independent voters. We estimate the
transition ratio pc and herder’s probability of correct choice in the experiment and compared
it with that for the analog herders system.
5.1 Voting model and thermodynamic limit
We introduce a stochastic process {X(t|p)}, t ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , T } for p ∈ [0, 1]. X(t + 1|p) ∈
{0, 1} is a Bernoulli random variable. Its probabilistic rule depends on C1(t) = ∑tt′=1 X(t′|r, p)
and herders’ proportion p. Given {C1(t) = n1}, we denote the probability that a herder chooses
(copies) the correct option by qh(t, n1). As qh(t, n1) has symmetry qh(t, n1) = 1 − qh(t, t − n1),
qh(t, n1) takes 1/2 at n1/t = 1/2. We assume that qh(t, n1) is a smooth and monotonically
increasing function of n1/t. The probabilistic rule that X(t + 1|r, p) obeys under the condition
is
Prob(X(t + 1|p) = 1|n1) = (1 − p) + p · qh(t, n1),
Prob(X(t + 1|p) = 0|n1) = p · (1 − qh(t, n1)).
We denote the probability that X(t + 1|p) takes 1 under the condition by q(n1/t|p) and the
probability function Prob(C1(t) = n) for p by P(t, n|p). The master equation for P(t, n|p) is
P(t + 1, n|p) = q((n − 1)/t|p) · P(t, n − 1|p)
+ (1 − q(n/t|p)) · P(t, n|p). (6)
The expected value of Z(t|p) = 1t C1(t) is then estimated as
E(Z(t|p)) =
t∑
n=0
P(t, n|p) · n
t
.
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We are interested in the limit value of Z(t|p) as t →∞, which we denote as z:
z ≡ lim
t→∞
Z(t|p).
In the one-peak phase, Z(t|p) always converges to E(Z(t|p)) in the limit, which we denote as
z+. In the two-peak phase, in addition to z+, Z(t|p) converges to a value smaller than half,
which we denote as z−, with some positive probability. It is a probabilistic process and one
cannot predict to which fixed point Z(t|p) converges. To determine the threshold value pc
between these phases and the limit value z±, one needs to solve the following self-consistent
equation:18
z = q(z|p) = (1 − p) + p · qh(t, t · z). (7)
Given p, if there is only one solution, it is z+ and the system is in the one-peak phase. The
convergence exponent γ is obtained by estimating the slope of q(z|p) at z = z+.18, 27 If there
are three solutions, which we denote as z1 < zu < z2, z1 (z2) corresponds to z− (z+). The
middle solution zu is an unstable state and Z(t|p) departs from zu as t increases. The method
gives the rigorous results for z and γ where q(z|p) is given as smooth function of z.
Fig. 4. Schematic view of the self-consistent equation z = q(z|p) = (1 − p) + p · qh(t, t · z) for the system of
analog herders : qh(t, t · z) = z. (z, q(z|p)) connects (0, 1 − p) and (1, 1) by a direct line. There is only one stable
solution z+ at z = 1 for p < 1.
Figure 4 shows the case of analog herders and q(z|p) = (1 − p) + p · qh(t, t · z) with
qh(t, t · z) = z.25 As one can easily see, for any value of p < 1, there is only one stable solution
z+ at z = 1. The system is in the one-peak phase and Z(t|p) always converges to z+ = 1 for
p < 1. As the independent voter’s probability of correct choice q is 100%, that of herders is
estimated as 1 by (z+ − (1 − p) · 1)/p. Even in the worst limit p → 1, the system of analog
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herders can take the probability of correct choice to one.
5.2 Transition ratio pc(r) for cases r ∈ {C, M}
Table III. Transition ratio pc of the voting (average herders) model. We determine pc using the condition
that the self-consistent equation (7) has three or more solutions for p > pc.
EXP. r pc(r) r pc(r)
I C 86.0% M 95.7%
II C 86.5% M 96.7%
We introduce an average herders model where qh(t, t · z) is given by linear extrapolation
of the values qh(t, n1|r) in equation (5). In our previous work,16 we model the behavior of
herders by the following functional form with two parameters a and λ:
1
2
(a tanh(λ(n1/t − 1/2)) + 1) . (8)
However, the fitted result by the standard maximum likelihood estimation cannot capture the
behavior of herders in the crucial region n1/t ∼ 1/2. We adopt the above linear extrapolated
qh(t, n1|r) for qh(t, t ·z) and solve the self-consistent equation (7). We determine pc(r) for cases
r ∈ {C, M} by the condition that the self-consistent equation has three or more solutions. We
summarize the results in Table III. In case C, pc(C) is from 86.0% (EXP-I) to 86.5% (EXP-
II). In case M, pc(M) is from 95.7% (EXP-I) to 96.7% (EXP-II). However, these estimates
depend on the behavior of qh(t, n1) near n1/t = 1/2 where the estimate errors are big. We can
at most say that pc(M) > pc(C).
5.3 Herder’s probability of correct choice
We estimate the probability of correct choice by a herder as a function of p.29 As for the
voting model, it can be estimated using the expectation value of Z(t|p) as
E((Z(t|p) − (1 − p) · 1)/p).
For the experimental data, we take the average of (Z(i|r)− (1− p(i)) · 1)/p(i) over the samples
in I(No.):
1
|I(No.)|
∑
i∈I(No.)
(Z(i|r) − (1 − p(i)) · 1)/p(i).
We plot the results in Figure 5. The experimental results show that the probability of correct
choice in case C is better than that in case M except for the samples in I(6). As system size T
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Fig. 5. Plot of herders’ probability of correct choice, (E(Z(T |r)) − (1 − p))/p vs. p, for the voting model.
Symbol ◦ (△) indicates the experimental data for the four bins I(6), I(7), I(8), and I(9) in Table II for case C (M).
The lines show the results of the stochastic model with system size T = 60, r = C (thin solid); T = 60, r = M
(thin dashed); 106, r = C (thick solid); and 106, r = M (thick dashed). We also plot the result of the stochastic
model for analog herders qh(t, n1) = n1/t with T = 60 (thin dotted) and 106 (thick dotted).
increases, for p < pc(C), the probability of correct choice in case C remains better than that in
case M. However, the maximum value of qh(t, n1|C) is about 0.9 and the probability of correct
choice saturates at the value for p < pc(C). As p exceeds pc(C), the probability of correct
choice in case C rapidly decreases and dips below that in case M. From the information
cascade transition, herders’ probability of correct choice is much lowered and this results in
the poor performance. In contrast, the poor performance of herders in case M for p < pc(C)
comes from the saturation of qh(t, n1|M) at n1/t = 3/4. From the saturation, the probability
of correct choice cannot reach the high value. For comparison, we show the results of the
optimal system of analog herders with T = 60 and 106. In the thermodynamic limit, the
probability of correct choice converges to one for p < 1.
6. Conclusions
Social influence, which here is restricted only to information regarding the choices of oth-
ers, yields inaccuracy in the majority choice. If a herder receives summary statistics {CA,CB}
and the payoff for the correct choice is constant, he strongly tends to copy the majority. The
correct information given by independent voters is buried below the herd and the majority
choice does not necessarily teach us the correct one if herders’ proportion exceeds pc(C).16
When the return is set to be proportional to multipliers {MA, MB} that are inversely propor-
tional to summary statistics {CA,CB}, the situation is a zero-sum game between a herder and
other previous subjects who have set the multipliers. The optimal max-min strategy is that of
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analog herders who choose α ∈ {A, B} with probability proportional to Cα. Furthermore, the
system of analog herders with q = 1 maximizes the probability of the correct choice for any
value of p in the thermodynamic limit. Even in limit p → 1, only the system can take the
probability of correct choice to one.
We performed a laboratory experiment to study herders’ behavior under the influence
of multipliers {MA, MB}. We showed that they collectively behave almost as analog herders
for 4/3 ≤ m ≤ 4, where m is the multiplier. Outside the region, herders’ copy probability
qh(t, n1|M) saturates at about 3/4 for n1/t ≥ 3/4 and it deviates from that of analog herders’,
qh(t, n1) = n1/t. As a result, the probability of correct choice by a herder cannot reach a high
value as compared to in the system of analog herders.
The system size and number of samples in our experiment are very limited, and thus it is
difficult to estimate pc precisely. More importantly, in the estimation of p, we assume herder’s
q is 50%. It is the precondition of the experiment and we eliminate data which does not fulfill
the condition. However, the procedure does not assure the precondition. In order to estimate
p more precisely and check the precondition, it is necessary to improve the experimental
design or the data analysis procedure. In addition, in our experimental setup, the subjects
have to choose between A and B. In addition, in our analysis of the experimental data, we
only observe the average behavior of many herders. An interesting problem is whether a
herder can adopt the max-min strategy at the individual level or only the average herder can
do it. In order to clarify this, one good way is to permit people to divide their choice and
vote fractionally. If the fraction voted by a subject is proportional to the summary statistic of
previous subjects’ choices, it suggests that the subject can adopt the max-min strategy at the
individual level. We think that a more extensive experimental study of the system and of the
related systems deserves further attention.30 Such experimental studies should provide new
approach to econophysics24, 31–35 and socio-physics.36
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Appendix A: Additional information about the Experiment
In EXP-I, 120 subjects were recruited from the Literature Department of Hokkaido Uni-
versity. We made two groups of about sixty subjects and the subjects in each group answered
120 questions one by one. Because of the capacity of the laboratory, we could not perform
the whole experiment at a time. We divide the subjects of each group into five sub-groups of
about 12 subjects. In one session, subjects in a sub-group sequentially answered the questions.
After five sessions we have gathered the data from all the subjects in a group.
Subjects were paid in cash upon being released from the session. There was a 500 yen
(about 5 dollars) participation fee and additional rewards that were proportional to the number
of points gained. In cases O and C, one correct choice was worth two points, and one point
was worth one yen (about one cents). In case M, one correct choice was worth the multiplier
itself. In the main text, we treat case M as zero-sum game. Considering the participation
fee, we can regard it as constant sum game, which is equivalent to a zero-sum game. As for
EXP-II, detailed information can be found in.16
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Fig. B·1. Snapshot of the screen for case M. Multipliers {MA, MB} are given in the second row in the box.
Appendix B: Experimental procedure
We explain the experimental procedure in EXP-I in detail. All the subjects in a sub-group
entered the laboratory and sat in the partitioned spaces. Using slides, we showed subjects how
the experiment would proceed. We explained that we were studying how their choices were
affected by the choices of others. In particular, we emphasized that social information was
realistic information calculated from the choices of previous subjects. Through the slides, we
also explained how to calculate multipliers {MA, MB} in case M, with a concrete example.
After the explanation, the subjects logged into the experiment web site using their IDs and
started to answer the questions. Interaction between subjects was permitted only through the
social information given by the experiment server. A question was chosen by the experiment
server and displayed on the monitor. First, subjects answered the fist half of the 120 questions
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 60} using only their own knowledge (r = O). After answering all the sixty
questions in case O, the subjects answered the same 60 questions in case C. Finally, the
subjects answered the same questions in case M. In each case, the experiment server chose
a question among the sixty questions at random that was not served to the other subjects at
the time. Otherwise, we cannot give correct social information to the t + 1-th subject from all
previous t subjects. After a five-minute interval, we repeated the same procedure so that the
subjects answered all 120 questions.
Figure B·1 shows the experience of the subjects in case M. In the example covered in
the figure, already nine subjects have answered question 30. The multipliers are given in
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the second row along with the number of subjects who answered the question. Only one
subject among nine has chosen A and the remaining eight subjects have chosen B. Multiplier
MA (MB) is calculated as 10/(1 + 1) = 5 (10/(8 + 1) = 1.1). The multipliers are rounded off
to one decimal place.
In EXP-II, the experience of the subjects is almost the same as in EXP-I.16 The difference
lies in how the experiment proceeds. In EXP-II, each subject answered each question from
case O to case M. After that, the experiment server chose another question. The process
continues until the subject has answered all questions. The subjects were likely to easily
remember the answers for the earlier cases with different social information and be careful in
choosing answers in the later cases. In order to exclude such an effect, we changed the system
to that in EXP-I.
Appendix C: Contorollability of the difficulty level of a question
We have used the same 120 questions in EXP-I and EXP-II. For the selection process,
please refer to our previous paper.16 Here, we study whether the difficulty of a question is an
inherent property or not. For this purpose, we compare the percentage of correct answers to
each question in case O in Group A and in Group B. It is defined for Group A as Z(i|O) =
∑Ti
s=1 X(i, s|O)/Ti and for Group B as Z(i + 120|O) =
∑Ti+120
s=1 X(i + 120, s|O)/Ti+120. We show
the scatter plot {Z(i|O), Z(i + 120|O)} in Figure C·1.
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
Z(
i+1
20
|O
), G
rou
p B
Z(i|O), Group A
ρ=0.8997
Fig. C·1. Scatter plots of Z(i|O) vs. Z(i + 120|O) in EXP-I. Pearson’s correlation coefficient ρ is 0.8997.
As one can clearly see the distribution almost on the diagonal line, we can infer that
there is a strong correlation. Pearson’s correlation coefficient ρ is about 0.90. In EXP-II, we
observe the same feature and ρ is about 0.82. The strong correlation means that if a question
is difficult (easy) for the subjects in a group, it would also be difficult (easy) for the subjects
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in the other group. The system sizes in our experiments are very limited and there remains
some fluctuation in the estimation of Z(i|O), but it will disappear for a large system. We can
control the difficulty levels of the questions in the experiment and study the response of a
subject under controlability. This aspect is important when one makes some prediction based
on the results presented in this paper.
Appendix D: Uniqueness of the analog herders system
In the main text, we show that the system of analog herders maximizes the probability of
correct choice for p < 1 and can take it to one for any p < 1. Here, we show that only the
system of analog herders can do it.
Fig. D·1. Schematic view of the self-consistent equation z = q(z|p) = (1 − p) + p · qh(t, t · z) with general
qh(t, t · z). (z, q(z|p)) connects (0, 1 − p) and (1, 1) by a continuous curve. As z+ = 1 is a stable solution, q(z|p)dz at
z = 1 is one or less. If qh(t, t · z) deviates from z, for p′ > pc, in addition to the stable solution z+ at z = 1, there
is at least one stable solution z− for z < 1.
As the system with analog herders assures that the probability of correct choice is one for
any p < 1, the self-consistent equation for the system considered must have only one stable
solution z+ at z = 1. If the equation has more than one stable solution and the probability
of convergence to solutions less than one is finite, the probability of correct choice cannot
take one. The self-consistent equation has a solution z+ at z = 1, qh(t, t · z) must take 1 (0)
at z = 1(0). In addition, as z+ is stable, the slope of q(z|p) at z = 1 is one or less. The curve
(z, q(z)) connects (0, (1 − p)) and (1, 1) as in Figure D·1. The curve of the system of analog
herders connects the two points by a direct line. If qh(t, t ·z) deviates from z, the curve between
the two points is rippling above and below the direct line. Then, one can see that there is some
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threshold value pc < 1, where for p > pc, the curve has more than three intersections with
the diagonal line y = z. In this case, in addition to the stable solution z+, there exists another
stable solution z− less than one. The probability of correct choice becomes less than one and
the statement is proved.
Appendix E: Exponent γ
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Fig. E·1. Plot of γ vs. p. We plot the results of the average herders model for EXP-I for (A) Case C and (B)
Case M. Symbol (◦) denotes γs vs. pavg in EXP-I, which are estimated in Figure 2. The lines show the results
of the stochastic model with system size T = 60 (thin solid) and T = ∞ (thick solid).
In order to check the validity of the stochastic model for cases r ∈ {C, M}, we study the
converge exponent γ. We solve the master equation (6) recursively and obtain P(t, n|p) for
t ≤ T = 60 for EXP-I. We estimate the convergence exponent γ from the slope of Var(Z(t|p))
as
γ = log Var(Z(T − ∆T |p))
Var(Z(T |p)) / log
T
T − ∆T
. (E·1)
We take ∆T = 50 to match the analysis of the experimental data in Figures 2A and B. In
order to give the error bar of γ for the experimental results, we adopted the voting model to
simulate the system and estimate the 95% confidence interval.16 For T = ∞ (thermodynamic
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limit), we estimate the gradient q′(z+|p) of q(z|p) at z = z+ and use the formula γ = Min(1, 2−
2 · q′(z+|p)).18 The results are summarized in Figure E·1 for (A) case C and (B) case M.
For T = 60, the model describes the experimental results well. In the limit T → ∞, γ
monotonically decreases from 1 to 0.
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